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The divestiture of the Bell system on January 1, 1984, will likely be
remembered as the day on which competition in telecommunications mar-
kets passed the point of no return. Although the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) had been attempting to encourage competition for sev-
eral decades,1 January 1, 1984, was the day on which the battle lines
were drawn between parent and child. If competition had been only an
experiment in selected telecommunications submarkets until that day, the
experiment was over. Much like a spark in a dry forest that soon becomes
a blazing inferno, the FCC learned there is no such thing as a little
competition.
From an efficiency standpoint, competitive entry in telecommunications
markets should have signalled the end of traditional rate design, which
levied excessive charges on long distance service as a massive subsidy for
basic exchange service.2 But this traditional tariff structure, commonly
known as the toll-to-local-subsidy, was so politically popular that ending
it was considered almost a crime against the state.' Residual regulations
left by the incomplete removal of cross-subsidization caused rate dispari-
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1. See G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRU(-
TURE 148-284 (1981).
2. Basic exchange service is the traditional phone service for residential and small business cus-
tomers. It generally includes access to the public switched network and flat-rate local calling.
3. At divestiture approximately 14¢ per minute of every interstate toll call was a subsidy designed
to keep basic residential exchange rates below cost. Similar subsidy flows occurred in the intrastate
jurisdiction. See An Economic History of the U.S. Telecommunications Industry to 1985: A Public
Choice Perspective: Hearings Before the Joint Select Comm. on Telecommunications, 1984 Wash.
Sess. (statement of John T. Wenders); L. JOHNSON, COMPETITION AND CROss-SuBSIDIZATION IN
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (Rand Corp. Publication No. R-2976-RC/NSF) (1982); Kahn & Shew,
Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 YALE J. ON REC.. 191 (1987);
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ties which competitive market forces rushed to exploit at a much faster
rate than regulators could respond. Thus January 1, 1984, was not only
the day of divestiture but also the day that telecommunications users and
new market entrants mobilized in response and created a new factor in
telecommunications: bypass. Bypass denotes those methods employed by
users to partially or totally circumvent the conventional telephone services
provided by regulated telephone companies, and it has become perhaps the
most controversial and misunderstood issue facing the telecommunications
industry today.
Faced with the prospect of large scale revenue losses from bypass, the
local companies must now confront the fact that competitive rate reform is
not occurring quickly enough to save the upper end of the carrier access
market. The local companies have concentrated their efforts on various
non-traffic sensitive (NTS)4 cost recovery plans, while a significant pro-
portion of business access minutes remain vulnerable to bypass on traffic
sensitive rate elements alone. Competitive market forces are capitalizing
on these transitional rate asymmetries much faster than regulatory rate
reform is moving to eliminate them. The telecommunications industry is
in need of a plan to smooth these transitional asymmetries.
The entities that regulate the telecommunications industry have not
agreed upon the best way to manage the transition to greater competition
or even whether to have a transition at all. The FCC, Congress, state
public service commissions, and federal and state courts all play a role,
sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting, in regulating telecommuni-
cations markets.' The result is a great deal of confusion and frustration on
the part of both the regulated firms and their customers.
The prospects for the local companies in the carrier access market today
J. HARING, IMPLICATIONS OF ASYMMETRIC REGULATION FOR COMPETITION POLICY ANALYSIS 1,
6 & n.9 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 14, 1984); MacAvoy & Robinson,
Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON
RFG. I (1983); Weisman & Kridel, Competition in U.S. Telecommunications: Rejoinder to the Sub-
sidy Myth, 11 TELECOMM. POL'Y 82 (1987); Wenders & Egan, The Implications of Economic Effi-
ciency for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 10 TELECOMM. POL'Y 33 (1986).
4. Telecommunications costs are institutionally divided according to the separations process into
non-traffic sensitive (NTS) and traffic sensitive (TS) costs. NTS costs are those generally associated
with the provision of local loops, such as poles, conduits, and wire pairs. NTS costs are in essence
access related costs because they refer to plant and equipment costs incurred in providing customers
with access to the network. TS costs generally refer to local switching and transport costs. TS costs
are in essence usage related costs because they refer to plant and equipment required for use on the
network (as opposed to access to the network). It is critical to realize that this division of costs between
NTS and TS does not parallel the economic classification of costs into fixed and variable. In fact, a
large portion of TS costs are fixed.
5. This situation in the telecommunications industry stands in dramatic contrast to the deregula-
tion of the airline industry which was regulated by a single entity-the Civil Aeronautics Board. For
an analysis of the deregulation of the airline industry, see Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated
Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REC,. 393 (1987).
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is bleak at best. The pieces are all in place for bypass to develop on a
large scale. Regulators have set switched access charges at levels far above
marginal cost with little likelihood of significant reduction in the near fu-
ture. The interexchange carriers (IXCs) already have tariffs in place that
allow end-users to bypass the local companies' switched access services."
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), the largest IXC,
has developed its capability to service the bypass market.7
The question arises as to what is the best course of action for the local
companies. The answer may well lie in a rather inconspicuous place. In
most jurisdictions today, local companies must assume the obligation to be
the carrier of last resort." In addition, it appears that most bypass net-
works are engineered to use local company switched access facilities for
back-up in the event of system failure and for overflow during periods of
peak utilization. As a result, regardless of the quality of the system pur-
chased by the bypasser, overall telecommunications reliability is increased
because the bypasser now has two telecommunications systems: the private
bypass system and the public switched network. When bypassers do use
local company facilities, they pay only usage sensitive charges. This is
clearly a market failure since, under present tariff structures, local compa-
nies cannot charge for the option of use but only for actual use, though
the great preponderance of the local companies' costs are incurred to pro-
vide the option of use. Facility bypassers are presently being subsidized.
If regulations were changed to allow local companies to charge for
maintaining the default network capacity necessary to meet the back-up
requirements of bypassers, bypassers would then have the options of ei-
ther paying such charges or building redundancy or back-up capacity into
their own bypass networks. The need to construct self-contained redun-
dancy would significantly increase and perhaps even double the costs of
facility bypass. Thus, whether or not a company chose to pay for (or
build) its own back-up capacity, the incentives for widespread inefficient
bypass would be reduced.
6. See, e.g., AT&T Communications Tariffs Nos. 1, 9, 10, CC Docket No. 85-203, Memoran-
dum and Order (FCC Mimeo No. 36262, released June 20, 1985).
7. AT&T has entered the microwave market through a joint license agreement with Digital Mi-
crowave Corporation (DMC). Removal of a structural separations requirement between AT&T
Communications and AT&T Information Systems allows AT&T to act as a single point of contact for
both their customers' carrier access and long distance needs. Finally, AT&T now apparently has the
capability to engage in terminating bypass through recent software enhancements to their 4ESS
switches. For a description of 4ESS switches, see AT&T Bi:i.t. LABORATORIES, ENGINEERING ANt)
OPERATIONS IN THE BELL SYSTEMS 425-430 (R. Rey ed. 1983). For a comprehensive discussion of
the technological viability of terminating bypass, see C. JACKSON, ASSESSMENT OF THE TFCHNOLOG-
ICAL POTENTIAL FOR TERMINATING BYPASS, (August 1986) (study prepared for Southwestern Bell
Co. by Shooshan and Jackson, Inc.).
8. The carrier of last resort obligation refers to the legal duty of the local phone company to
provide exchange service to anyone, on a timely basis, anywhere in their certificated geographic area.
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This Article proposes the institution of Default Capacity Tariffs ena-
bling the local companies to charge for the maintenance of back-up capac-
ity which would discourage socially inefficient bypass and promote an im-
proved post-divestiture telecommunications market. Specifically, facility
bypassers would pay flat rate default capacity charges to ensure the avail-
ability of back-up capacity in the event of system failure or overflow dur-
ing periods of peak utilization. These default capacity charges should be
levied on a flat rate basis, much like insurance premiums, because capac-
ity costs are incurred independently of usage levels. If these default capac-
ity charges are not made mandatory, facility bypassers may opt to build
their own back-up capacity or redundancy. In either case, the cost of facil-
ity bypass is increased, and the net cost to society from economically inef-
ficient factor substitution is reduced. Part I of this Article presents a brief
exposition of the telecommunications market at divestiture and describes
the immediate effects on market structure that resulted. It also analyzes
flexible pricing, an avenue through which to address the bypass phenome-
non. Part II discusses the issue of residual regulatory obligations, viewing
them as the result of a social contract between local companies and their
regulators. Part III presents the proposal for Default Capacity Tariffs
and explores its rationale on grounds of both economic efficiency and eq-
uity, showing that the plan would promote efficient network utilization
while allowing general ratepayers to realize a positive externality from the
use of default network capacity. Part IV identifies some of the subtle cost-
ing concepts underlying the proposal, emphasizing the need to go beyond
efficient recovery of NTS costs, a point that may seem obvious, but that
has been overlooked by many industry observers.
Part V elaborates the major pricing issues involved, revealing that de-
fault capacity charges will probably grant the local companies a degree of
flexibility in the pricing of special access. Nonetheless, these charges
should not be administered anti-competitively, nor can they serve as a
substitute for driving switched access rates closer to economic cost. Failure
to heed these principles would violate both the spirit and economic logic
upon which this proposal is based. In addition, there are multi-
dimensional peak-load pricing considerations underlying this proposal
that would allow non bypassing ratepayers to utilize default capacity dur-
ing peak periods and yet avoid peak period charges. Part VI shows that
the structure underlying these default capacity charges is not without reg-
ulatory precedent. Both the natural gas and electric industries in the
United States are currently exploring similar themes. The Article con-
cludes that the concept of default capacity charges presented herein repre-
sents a viable avenue through which society more readily may realize the
Vol. 5: 149, 1988
Default Capacity Tariffs
full benefits of competition while avoiding the prospectively large and ir-
reversible inefficiencies of transitional rate asymmetries.
I. Background
The regulatory requirement of cross-subsidization of local residential
service by long distance service continues in the post-divestiture era for
regulated local phone companies. To describe this situation we first need
to examine the geographic division of the telephone system and define a
number of terms. As part of the January 1, 1984, divestiture of the Bell
system, the territorial United States was partitioned into 163 separate geo-
graphic areas or Local Access Transport Areas (LATAs). Calls within a
LATA are termed intraLATA and are carried predominantly by local
exchange companies, unless the appropriate state public service commis-
sion has sanctioned intraLATA toll competition. In the latter case the in-
terexchange carriers (IXCs such as AT&T, MCI, and U.S. Sprint) may
also carry intraLATA toll calls. Calls between two LATAs are termed
interLATA and are carried exclusively by the interexchange carriers as
the local exchange companies are expressly precluded from serving this
market under the terms and conditions of the divestiture agreement.'
For both intraLATA and interLATA calls the local exchange compa-
nies provide local distribution services termed carrier access. In other
words, the switching and transport functions within the local exchange
necessary to serve end-users at each end of the call are provided by the
local exchange companies under a series of tariffs commonly referred to as
switched access tariffs. The interexchange carriers pay the local exchange
companies for the local distribution of their interLATA and intraLATA
calls within the local exchange. For example, a typical long distance call
from San Francisco, California to St. Louis, Missouri will generally in-
volve two local exchange companies and one interexchange carrier. From
the end-user's station set (telephone) in San Francisco, Pacific Telesis will
distribute that call to the interexchange carrier's toll office or point-of-
presence. The call will travel over a long haul microwave, satellite, or
fiber optic network to the interexchange carrier's toll office or point-of-
9. The Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) restricted the Bell operating companies to the
provision of local exchange service and intraLATA toll services, i.e., the Bell operating companies
were restricted from the long distance market with the exception of providing toll service within their
LATA boundaries. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Notably, while the inter-exchange
carriers could provide intraLATA toll services in competition with the Bell operating companies,
subject to state public service commission approval, in most cases the Bell operating companies were
explicitly precluded from offering interLATA toll services by terms of the MFJ. This delineation was
theoretically designed to separate competitive services from the bottleneck monopoly services of the
local exchange companies.
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presence in the Missouri area. From that point, Southwestern Bell will
distribute that call within the local exchange to the end-user's station set
(telephone) on the terminating end of the call. The interexchange carrier's
bill to the end-user for the toll call will include payments to Pacific Tele-
sis and Southwestern Bell for local distribution of the call. The payments
to the local exchange companies are the switched access charges. The
cross-subsidization is implemented by raising switched access charges-
and, indirectly, intraLATA and interLATA toll service rates-to levels
far above their marginal costs. The excess revenues are used to subsidize
rates paid by local residential users. The resulting market distortions are
clear as are the incentives to evade the excess cost the market distortion
imposes by bypassing the local phone company's switched access services.
Similar rate and cost distortions exist with respect to pricing in-
traLATA toll services. It is not uncommon for intraLATA toll rates to be
set at levels five to six times their estimated marginal cost. Consequently,
medium and large toll users pay rates far in excess of the NTS costs they
actually impose on the system. Competitive entry in the carrier access
market now affords these customers an alternative to the payment of sub-
sidy laden switched access charges and artificially inflated intraLATA toll
rates. This alternative is bypass.
While there are many forms of bypass, perhaps as many as there are
services that the local companies provide, the form most worrisome to lo-
cal companies is carrier access bypass. Local companies perceive carrier
access bypass as a major financial threat, as the IXCs have a clear eco-
nomic incentive in its use. For expositional purposes, we define bypass as
either a direct connection between a customer's premises and an IXC's
point-of-presence or a self-contained end-to-end system using facilities
that circumvent the switched access services of the local exchange carrier.
This network architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. When this direct con-
nection is established using special access lines that are actually owned by
the local company, leased by the IXC, and not subject to usage-sensitive
charges, the practice is referred to as service bypass. When this direct
connection is established using private facilities (such as microwave radio
or satellite) it is referred to as facility bypass."0 Both service and facility
bypass cause significant revenue losses for the local companies. The eco-
nomics of the bypass decision are illustrated in Figure 2. Initially, with
the NTS costs loaded into switched access tariffs, all customers with usage
10. See MTS and WATS Market Structure: Establishment of a Joint Board: Amendment, 50
Fed. Reg. 939 (1985).
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Figure 1
Primary Types of Bypass
A - Special access to IXC (service bypass)
B - Direct connect to IXC (facility bypass) via microwave
C - End-to-end private satellite network (facility bypass)
Figure 2
The Economics of Bypass
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in excess of point A have economic incentives to bypass. When NTS costs
are deloaded from switched access tariffs, the break-even usage level for
bypass declines to point B.
Bypass as a form of competition in the local exchange has been and
continues to be a troublesome problem for regulators."a Even if all parties
to the regulatory process were to agree that the problem of bypass of the
public switched network should be addressed, the solutions would not nec-
essarily be politically palatable. For instance, under a fixed revenue re-
quirement, rate-of-return regulation, if regulators allowed the local ex-
change companies sufficient pricing flexibility to retain large business
customers on the switched network, basic exchange rates would generally
rise, perhaps significantly. Regulators, therefore, are naturally sensitive to
the political implications of raising concern over universal service12 which
surround such a pricing policy. Certainly, there are any number of politi-
cal pressures that render it problematic for regulators to adopt pricing
policies that significantly effect the rates charged for the vast majority of
the electorate. One possible solution is to allow the local companies to
have greater pricing flexibility in order to efficiently and effectively com-
pete in the market. But denying the existence of competition in the short
run obviates the need for politically unpopular rate reform.
One specific proposal to the bypass problem is to grant the local compa-
nies pricing flexibility in the form of a volume tapered rate schedule to
keep large business customers on the switched network. While such a
pricing plan would be most effective in retaining large users on the net-
work, it too suffers from political problems involving equity. Such a pric-
ing schedule would modestly raise rates for small business and residential
customers. But criticism on these grounds would be naive because it gives
no consideration to the greater effect on the bills of small business and
residential customers when those moderate and large users bypass the
public switched network stranding investment and forcing fixed costs to be
11. See Weisman, Transition to Telecommunications Competition Amid Residual Regulatory Ob-
ligations, 120 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 6, 1987, at 14; In Search of Industry Unity On Carrier Access
Pricing: A Vision of the Future, TELEMATICS, June 1987; New England Tel. & Tel. Co. Petition
with the FCC for Waiver of Various Sections of Part 69 Rules (Dec. 3, 1986) (on file with author).
Technically, bypass could have been practiced before divestiture by the Other Common Carriers
(OCCs) but the Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA) tariffs were set at such
modest levels in the pre-divestiture market that there was little economic incentive to do so. In addi-
tion, end-to-end bypass, wherein the services of both the local companies and the interexchange carri-
ers are circumvented, has been economically viable for almost three decades. With the exception of
reselling opportunities, however, this form of bypass is limited to the very largest telecommunication
users with high point-to-point calling volumes.
12. Universal service refers to the goal of establishing on a nation-wide basis telephone service
that is both available and affordable. See AT&T BELL LABORATORIS, supra note 7, at 821. This
goal was established by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982)).
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spread among a smaller customer base. As long as the lowest rate neces-
sary to retain the would-be bypasser on the public switched network ex-
ceeds the per minute marginal cost, the burden on residual ratepayers is
less than it would otherwise be if these users were to bypass the local
company. In other words, as long as the rate charged to retain the poten-
tial bypasser makes some contribution, however small, to the common and
joint costs of the network, the residual customers-those who cannot take
advantage of the bypass option-are better off. The problem, in essence, is
that regulators and rate-payers alike may directly attribute the increase in
rates to flexible pricing, without realizing the greater increase in rates that
would occur without flexible pricing. Similarly, the actual number of po-
tential bypassers can only be estimated, and this estimation has not here-
tofore been determined with the degree of certainty satisfactory to most
state regulators.
The FCC was very much aware of the bypass problem and made a
valiant effort at proactive rate design through its own access charge
plan. 13 This plan called for the transfer of most NTS costs to the end-user
over a six year period. Despite numerous comprehensive studies that had
shown that the local companies' carrier access revenues were highly vul-
nerable to bypass, 4 the FCC's access charge plan ran into turbulent wa-
ters on virtually every front. 5 The de facto local rate increases resulting
from the FCC's plan were politically unpalatable. The plan, however
well intended, stalled well short of its goal.
II. Residual Regulatory Obligations
Key to understanding the problems inherent in the telecommunications
industry's transition to competition is the local companies' historical ac-
ceptance of social responsibilities or obligations in return for the regulated
local exchange franchises. These included two primary responsibilities:
the promotion of universal service and the carrier of last resort obliga-
13. For a discussion of this policy, see Egan & Weisman, The U.S. Telecommunications Industry
in Transition, 10 TELECOMM. POL'W 164, 167-169 (1986).
14. See BELL COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH, INC., THE IMPACT OF ACCESS CHARGES ON BY-
PASS AND UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE SERVICE, (1984) (study estimated bypass vulnerability on nation-
wide basis in 1984 at over $16 per access line per month which is equivalent to several billion dollars
annually); UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS: BYPASS OF
THE LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES (Aug. 1986); G. BROCK, BYPASS OF THE LOCAL EXCHANGE: A
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT (1984) (FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 12);
United States Telephone Association (USTA), Bypass Study (Oct. 5, 1984) (filed in response to the
FCC Public Notice of Mar. 28, 1984) (on file with author); D. Weisman & D. Kridel, The Bypass
Adoption Rate Study (presented at the International Symposium on Forecasting, Paris, France, June
1986); Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. TR-86-84 (Feb. 1986) (testimony of D. Weisman).
15. Congress, many state public service commissions, and most consumer activist groups opposed
the FCC's plan.
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tion.' The acceptance of these responsibilities may be viewed as an im-
plicit social contract between regulators and the local companies; the im-
plementation of which was facilitated by the development of the toll-to-
local subsidy.17 The express intent of this subsidy was to maintain resi-
dence basic exchange rates far below their average cost in order to pro-
mote subscription to the network in a manner consistent with the goal of
universal telephone service.
The local companies were also required to maintain a ubiquitous tele-
communications network throughout their franchised area, even if parts of
that network were not cost effective. If an end-user desired service, the
local companies were obliged to provide it, most frequently at a broadly
averaged monthly rate. The regulator was acting as an agent for the rate-
payer in negotiations with the local companies for the most favorable
terms of service. The regulator, through the local franchise, was in turn
asked to protect the local company's right to serve. Certainly one of the
most critical observations to make with respect to the historical origins of
regulation in telecommunications, is that the regulatory process was in-
voked as much for the purpose of social engineering as it was for the
purpose of efficiently providing what was perceived to be a natural mo-
nopoly service.
Finding the most efficient market structure for a particular good or ser-
vice is very much a process of discovery. Whether the telecommunications
industry is in fact a natural monopoly is an issue about which the empiri-
cal studies have been decidedly inconclusive.' As John Haring has ob-
served,'" the only meaningful way to determine the optimal or most effi-
cient market structure is to allow entry without imposing constraints such
as residual regulatory obligations. Incumbent firms in the post divestiture
market are still subject to residual regulatory obligations. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to infer clear conclusions about the most efficient market structure
from the observance of what appears to be competitive entry into telecom-
munications markets. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that when
rates are set without regard to actual underlying costs, competitive market
forces will attempt to exploit the discrepancies. It cannot be known
whether such competitors would have entered the market in the absence of
the imposition of residual regulatory obligations on market incumbents. A
16. See supra notes 8 & 12.
17. The toll-to-local subsidy refers to the practice of cross-subsidization described supra at note 3
and accompanying text as imposing excess charges on long distance users to subsidize basic local
exchange service.
18. See A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 127-52 (1971); 2 Evans & Heckman, Mul-
tiproduct Cost Function Estimates and Natural Monopoly Tests for the Bell System, in BREAKING
Up BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 253 (D. Evans ed. 1983).
19. See J. HARING, supra note 3, at 4.
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recent Federal Communications Law Journal article by authors including
Mark Fowler, formerly Chairman of the FCC, acknowledged the societal
costs of asymmetric regulatory policies:
The more specific questions concerning how best to manage this
transition are not susceptible to easy answers. It can be argued for
instance, that some of the commission's regulatory actions in the
inter-exchange markets that were designed to promote competition
during transition, such as highly discounted access pricing for other
common carriers and restrictions on competitive pricing responses by
AT&T, in fact have encouraged entry by uneconomic providers and
uneconomic construction of excess capacity. If this is true, the gradu-
alist approach to deregulation of inter-exchange markets will have
resulted in substantial unnecessary costs for society that never would
have been incurred in a truly competitive marketplace. Moreover,
this approach will have directly increased consumer costs by requir-
ing regulated firms to charge higher prices to protect competitors
during the transition.2"
Thus it is apparent that market entry occurring solely because of residual
regulatory obligations demonstrates a conflict between the social engineer-
ing and efficiency goals of regulation.
The advent of competitive entry in telecommunications markets has, of
necessity, altered the terms of the social contract. Competitive entrants to-
day are not subject to the residual regulatory obligations imposed upon
the local companies. This asymmetric regulation leads to an inefficient
market outcome since the true least-cost provider may be constrained from
being the least-price supplier. The regulated local companies today must
set carrier access tariffs so as to subsidize basic-exchange rates while com-
peting with new entrants who are free to set efficient prices based on costs.
The local companies must engineer for network ubiquity while their com-
petitors are free to cream-skim, that is, to provide service on only the
highest volume routes or for the most lucrative customers. As a result of
this asymmetric regulation, the local companies are doubly penalized.
They are required to price their services at above market rates which en-
courages the growth of bypass and must also provide the bypasser with
back-up facilities at less than cost.21 Such a regulatory and tariff structure
20. Fowler, Halprin & Schlicting, "Back to the Future": A Model for Telecommunications, 38
FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986).
21. The observation that such responsibilities might well handicap the incumbent firm in compet-
ing effectively in the market was first made by Alfred Kahn. A. KAHN, supra note 18, at 238. The
following passage is enlightening:
It is this problem that is the most troublesome aspect of the MCI case and others like it. If
such ventures are economically feasible only on the assumption that when they break down or
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is economically inefficient as well as inequitable. In fact, under present
rate-of-return regulation, this form of asymmetric regulation forces gen-
eral ratepayers to subsidize bypassers. In other words, the social costs of
bypass exceed the private costs.
It is instructive to view the regulatory constraints on the local compa-
nies as a tax on the services they provide that must be recouped by artifi-
cially high rates for carrier access and toll services. The market outcome is
predictable. Over time, the local companies will lose business to competi-
tive entrants who are not similarly constrained.22 Such are the economic
distortions of asymmetric regulation." Not only are such nonuniform reg-
ulatory policies economically inefficient and inequitable, but the economic
distortions they create are largely irreversible since telecommunications
networks are generally characterized by large sunk costs. Society will pay
the cost of this inefficiency for a long time.
The rush of competitive entry in telecommunications markets today, in
and of itself, says nothing about the underlying market structure or possi-
ble efficiency gains from such entry. What it indicates is that when rates
are set without regard to underlying economic costs, entry occurs which
may be uneconomical.2" Bypass, as a form of competition in the local ex-
changes, is not inherently bad. In certain situations, it may actually re-
present the most efficient network-serving arrangement and, therefore,
should not be discouraged. Economic inefficiency results, however, when
bypass is chosen because the incumbent's rates are higher than those of its
competitors, even though its costs are lower. This is the situation that
should be most troublesome to regulators because it represents a net loss
in social welfare. From a social engineering or equity perspective, bypass
adversely affects the residence and small business customers on whose be-
half regulators initially adopted these social engineering goals. When by-
pass occurs, the remaining users on the network must cover the fixed costs
previously spread over more ratepayers. This has a disproportionate effect
become congested subscribers may simply shift over to the Bell System for the duration of the
emergency, they are indeed supplying an only partial service. If the common carrier is obliged
to stand ready to serve and must carry the burden of excess capacity required to meet that
obligation, it would seem that the average total costs would necessarily be higher than those of
a private shipper or cream-skimming competitor who has no such obligation: the latter can
construct capacity merely sufficient for operation at 100 percent load factors, with the expecta-
tion that it or its customers can turn to the common carriers in case of need. Id.
22. The inequity of this process should be clear. It is similar to requiring one grocery store chain
to bear the entire cost of maintaining and implementing the Federal Food Stamp Program. The re-
sults are predictable: over time customers will leave the grocery store chain bearing the cost of the food
stamp program and migrate to another grocery store chain not likewise constrained. The market
outcome, of course, need have nothing to do with the underlying efficiencies of grocery provision.
23. The economic inefficiencies inherent in asymmetric regulation are the subject of the article by
J. HARING, supra note 3.
24. See Fowler, Halprin & Schlicting, supra note 20, at 180.
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on residence and small business ratepayers. Under asymmetric regulation,
the market is incapable of choosing the true least-cost provider.25
The local companies have only two possible courses of action to insure
their continued financial health: (1) convince regulators that sanctioned
competitive entry was an ill-conceived idea and attempt to reverse the pro-
cess; or (2) move toward cost-based pricing of their tariffed services in-
cluding efficient pricing of the default capacity required by the carrier of
last resort obligation. The second course of action is nearly as difficult as
the first is impossible. It is this second course of action, however, which is
the central theme of this paper and the subject of the next Part.
III. Default Capacity Flat Rate Tariffs
In the previous Part, I discussed the inherent objections to asymmetric
regulation based on both efficiency and equity. In this Part, I develop a
plan that allows for a more efficient transition from regulation to competi-
tion while addressing the political and regulatory concerns of residential
and small business customers.
Today most bypass networks are designed to utilize local company
switched access services as back-up. When bypassers do utilize these
switched access facilities they pay only usage sensitive charges based on
actual traffic volumes. In addition, should such bypassers require addi-
tional access lines on an immediate or short-term basis, they may be re-
quired to pay emergency private branch exchange (PBX)2" trunk-
installation rates.
Present tariff structure governing back-up capacity for facility bypas-
sers creates at least two major problems. First, there is no guarantee
under the regulatory rate averaging process that the tariff structure will
actually allow the local company to recover the costs incurred in the con-
struction and maintenance of additional network capacity required to pro-
vide back-up capacity for facility bypassers.27 Second, the local companies'
network capacity costs are incurred whether or not this default capacity
for facility bypassers is ever actually used. As a result, usage-sensitive re-
25. The Egan-Weisman-Wenders debate on this issue relates to the efficiency of the transition
path in telecommunications markets. See Egan & Weisman, supra note 13; Wenders, Throttling
Competition, 10 TELECOMM. POL'Y 177 (1986); Weisman & Egan, Throttling Competition: A Reply,
10 TE.ECOMM. POL'Y 271 (1986).
26. A PBX is a switching device, similar to the local company's central office, which is capable of
switching voice and data communication between employees in a single firm, tenants in a building, or
in other contiguous areas such as an office park or campus.
27. It should be noted that this cost recovery issue is exacerbated by the local companies' capital
reserve deficiency problems, which result from unrealistically slow depreciation schedules that were
set in a precompetitive era and were, therefore, never designed to recover capital costs in a competitive
market.
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covery of these network capacity costs is economically inefficient as it does
not reflect the cost of maintaining idle stand-by capacity. Efficiency can be
improved by recovering these default capacity costs in the form of flat rate
charges, much like insurance premiums. This observation leads to the fol-
lowing proposal:
Levy default capacity flat rate charges on facility bypassers as a
means of recovering capacity costs incurred by the local companies
for maintaining default network capacity.
This proposal for default capacity charges centers on two key issues:28
(1) the option value the facility bypasser derives from having back-up ca-
pacity provided by the local companies;29 and (2) the implicit social con-
tract under which the local companies originally agreed to incur construc-
tion and maintenance expense in the discharge of their obligation under
the local exchange franchise. It is immaterial whether or not the default
capacity is ever actually used. From the supply side of the market the vast
majority of the costs incurred by the local company are those costs associ-
ated with providing the option of use of the network and not with actual
usage on the network. From the demand side of the market bypassers
should be willing to pay to ensure that this option of default capacity
continues to be made available to them." These charges are very similar
28. It may be asked why default capacity charges should be levied against facility bypassers (using
private facilities) and not against service bypassers (using special access lines owned by the local
company and leased by the IXC). There are both network-engineering and institutional justifications
for this arrangement. A service bypasser will utilize switched access facilities to serve traffic require-
ments when special access circuits fail. In this case, aggregate network capacity will not necessarily
change; it may only be the form in which that capacity is accessed (special access to switched access)
that has changed. This occurs because switched access and special access share multiple common
facilities. See AT&T BELL LABORATIORIF-S, supra note 7, at 91. In fact, as technology moves in the
direction of virtual private lines, the distinction between switched access and service bypass should
become increasingly blurred. From an institutional perspective, the local company may have an obli-
gation to provide back-up in the event that its own special access equipment goes down, but why
should it provide uncompensated back-up in the event some competitor's equipment fails? It would be
analogous to requiring Ford Motor Company to provide free loaner cars to General Motors customers
whose cars have broken down. This would not be a natural outcome in a competitive market.
29. For seminal works on the theory of option value, see Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Business
Decisions: Market Failure, Imperfections, and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKI.OS 23 (1966); Weis-
brod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-Consumption Goods, 78 Q.J. ECON. 471
(1964). Kahn discusses option value in terms of market failure. A train running from New York City
to Ithaca, New York terminates service because it cannot cover costs, yet this train is the only mode of
transportation during inclement weather. Kahn maintains that prospective train passengers would
have been willing to compensate the train line for maintaining service to Ithaca whether or not they
ever rode the train. Market failure occurred in that no mechanisms were in place for extracting option
payments from prospective train passengers. Additional examples of option demand include fire pro-
tection services and precautionary cash balances. The option value on the liquidity of precautionary
cash balances is equal to (at least) the interest income forgone on these cash balances.
30. Professor Lester Taylor of the University of Arizona has suggested that it may be possible for
the local companies to negotiate with bypassers for the provision of default capacity on mutually
agreeable terms outside the regulatory environment.
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to insurance premiums which are paid whether or not a claim is ever
filed, since a pool of funds must be set aside to compensate the injured
party in the event of a loss.
The regulatory authorities could decide the degree to which default ca-
pacity charges should be mandatory or optional and for what period of
time. But the complexity of the issue goes beyond those choices to the
distinction that must be made between sunk and incremental back-up
costs and the resultant interplay with issues of economic efficiency and
equity. 1
This dilemma arises from the fact that the local companies' historic
revenue requirements, comprised of sunk and embedded costs incurred in
the past in order to fulfill its obligation to serve, frequently exceed incre-
mental costs. As a result, a customer who bypasses the public switched
network without mandatory payment of default capacity charges will have
shifted the burden of sunk cost recovery onto residual customers. Most
regulators would consider this inequitable. This would force the rates
charged to these residual customers even further above incremental costs,
thus precluding any possibility of economically efficient rate design. Con-
versely, situations may arise where the costs of providing back-up capacity
are truly incremental. This would occur in the form of variable costs of
maintaining existing capacity or opportunity costs (because existing capac-
ity can be used to supply residual customers) or costs associated with
building additional capacity. In this context, default capacity may be
priced in an economically efficient manner without residual customers ex-
periencing an inordinate and inequitable burden in the form of rate shock.
The prospect that default capacity charges may be mandatory for a des-
ignated period of time may strike some readers as anti-competitive. A
careful analysis will indicate this is not the case. In a competitive market,
the local companies would naturally enter into contractual arrangements
with their customers for the deployment of network capacity. Under the
local exchange franchise, however, the local companies provided such net-
work capacity under an implicit regulatory contract that was subsequently
31. 1 am indebted to Alfred Kahn for pointing out the importance of this distinction to me and for
providing an extremely lucid and insightful analysis of the critical economic issues.
As a pricing matter, if the local telecommunications company is subject to a carrier of last resort
obligation, then, in a perfectly logical world, default capacity tariffs would be mandatory for all
bypassers regardless of whether the bypasser had built redundancy into its bypass system. The reason
for such mandatory tariffs is straightforward-the application of the carrier of last resort obligation is
independent of the existence of private redundancy. Thus, private redundancy does not eliminate the
possibility that the bypasser will use the public switched network; it only reduces the likelihood of
such use (and the tariffs could be priced accordingly). However, in actuality, regulators will set tariffs
that reflect equity as well as economic efficiency.
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broken by competitive entry.32 It may be appropriate and is certainly eq-
uitable to stockholders and residual rate-payers alike to make default ca-
pacity charges mandatory for a period of time sufficient to allow the local
companies to recover their costs. 8
Whether or not the default capacity charge is mandatory or the
bypasser elects to build redundancy, the costs of facility bypass are in-
creased. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 3. The initial break-
even traffic volume level for facility bypass (without default capacity
charges) is Q. When the facility bypasser is required to pay default ca-
pacity charges, the new breakeven level is increased to Q.. As illustrated
in the diagram, the default capacity charges also provide the local compa-
nies with added flexibility for pricing special access services. This latter
point may be particularly critical during the transition to competition and
will be discussed in greater detail below.
The proposed flat rate tariff structure for recovering default capacity
costs has far-reaching implications. The option value that facility bypas-
sers place on default capacity is likely to be high. And while the emphasis
here has been placed on carrier access bypass, the logic underlying this
proposal extends to all forms of competition within the local exchange
where the local company must stand ready to provide default network
capacity on demand. This would include, for example, Metropolitan area
bypass, 8 ' shared tenant services (STS),3" and end-to-end bypass. 6
A question arises concerning the appropriateness of levying default ca-
pacity charges on facility bypassers when the local companies are operat-
ing under conditions of excess capacity. For example, a plausible, though
32. A local exchange franchise can reasonably be characterized as a government decree. For an
interesting discussion of the right to serve versus the right to be served, see Goldberg, Regulation and
Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 426 (1976). With respect to the argument
that the local companies should have foreseen competitive entry and adjusted accordingly, note that the
depreciation schedules that the local companies operate under require virtually infinite foresight with
regard to the risk associated with capital deployment.
33. For an interesting analysis of a similar issue as it relates to the electric power industry, see
Kahn, Who Should Pay for Power Plant Duds?, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1985, at 26, col. 3.
34. Metropolitan area bypass refers to the point-to-point or point-to-multi-point transmission of
telecommunications traffic within exchange boundaries using private facilities that circumvent the ser-
vices of the local exchange companies.
35. The telecommunications dimensions of STS generally involve the resale of local service in an
office or campus environment by a third party utilizing a PBX in combination with local exchange
company trunks. See supra note 26 and infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
36. End-to-end bypass refers to the point-to-point or point-to-multi-point transmission of telecom-
munications traffic across exchange boundaries using private facilities that circumvent the services of
the local exchange companies and frequently the local interexchange carriers. See supra p.15 4 and
supra Figure 1.
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Figure 3
The Economics of Bypass When
Facility Bypassers Must Pay For
Default Capacity Under Flat Rate Tariff
Total Switched Slope Equals
Access Charges Per Minute
Switched
Access Charg









from Q to Q',.
charges raise breakeven point for facility bypass
2. Default capacity charges define a range within which special access
rates may be increased.
3. If default capacity charges are not mandatory, no back-up is provided
by local company. Bypasser must purchase protection and/or hot
standby.
4. Whether default capacity charges are assessed or bypasser provides
own back-up, bypass vulnerability is reduced.
- Default Capacity Charges)
rospective Range for Increase
in Special Access Rates
Special Access
Facility Bypass
(No Default Capacity Charges)
Qo % Q;
Yale Journal on Regulation
incorrect, argument could be made that facility bypassers who default
back onto the switched network when the local companies are operating
with excess capacity actually cause no additional costs to be incurred, and,
therefore, they should not have to pay for this stand-by service. But the
argument is circular. The relevant question is not whether the local com-
panies are operating under conditions of excess capacity; rather the crucial
issue is to identify the underlying cause of the excess capacity. For exam-
ple, if the local companies deployed plant and facilities in a prudent fash-
ion under a "regulatory contract" that bestowed upon them an exclusive
right to serve, and they now experience excess capacity because that con-
tract was broken by allowing competitive entry, bypassers should not be
able to default to the switched network for free because it is not used to
capacity, when it is in fact the bypasser (as a competitor in the local ex-
change) who is, at least in part, the cause of this excess capacity. Con-
versely, if the regulatory authority deems that the local companies
deployed plant and equipment in an imprudent manner, as judged in rela-
tion to the regulatory rules in effect when that plant was deployed, the
local companies should not be able to recover their costs in the general
rate base. The costs should in that case be written off against stockholder
equity like any imprudent investment in a non-regulated market that
failed to generate the expected return.
On the equity side of this issue of excess capacity is the question of how
default capacity costs are recovered if bypassers are not required to com-
pensate the local companies for stand-by facilities. Under rate-of-return
regulation, the costs of the network capacity that the bypasser now utilizes
on a default basis are fully embedded in the local exchange company's
rate base and are primarily recovered on a usage-sensitive basis from reg-
ular, not default, users of the public switched network. This method of
cost recovery results in a cross-subsidy from general ratepayers to bypas-
sers. This situation is unlikely to be viewed favorably by the majority of
regulators. The issue that lies in the balance is the degree to which the
customer intending to bypass the local company retains an obligation for
the costs of facilities deployed under the local company's obligation to
serve. In other words, was the potential bypasser a party to the regulatory
contract under which the local company was charged with the exclusive
right to serve? If so, should the customer intending to bypass be allowed
to disavow any recurring obligation for cost recovery by shifting that cost
recovery to residual ratepayers, who consist predominantly of residential
and small business ratepayers?
Finally, if the local companies deploy plant and facilities without con-
sidering stand-by or default capacity service, traffic engineering problems
will arise. When a facility bypasser's primary system fails, the traffic that
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normally flows over the bypass system would be diverted to the public
switched network. If this system failure occurred during a peak period,
traffic congestion for all customers served out of that particular central
office would rise. The service levels that resulted for general ratepayers
would probably be considered unacceptable by regulators. This is why it
is critically important that the local companies' obligation to stand-by for
facility bypassers be clearly defined and plant and equipment be deployed
accordingly. Otherwise, general ratepayers will pay for this stand-by ser-
vice, first, by directly paying for the actual costs of plant and equipment
necessary to provide default capacity to bypassers, or second, by paying in
terms of higher congestion on the public switched network when facility
bypass systems fail. In either case, general ratepayers are being asked to
subsidize facility bypassers for stand-by service.
A case in point may help to clarify both the magnitude and complexity
of the default capacity issue. McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, an aero-
space firm with general headquarters in St Louis, Missouri, recently in-
stalled its own private telecommunications network."7 In fact, the size of
this network makes McDonnell's system the twentieth-largest private tele-
phone company in the United States. The $58 million network connects
54,000 phones at ten sites in the St. Louis metropolitan area and in Cali-
fornia. The McDonnell-Douglas system bypasses the local companies on
both ends, Southwestern Bell in Missouri and Pacific Telesis in Califor-
nia. The revenue loss to Southwestern Bell resulting from McDonnell-
Douglas's bypass was estimated at $6 million annually.
Suppose that at some point McDonnell's system fails. The traffic that
would normally flow over the bypass system could be engineered to de-
fault over Southwestern Bell switched access facilities. McDonnell-
Douglas may pay for additional PBX trunks and the usage sensitive
charges associated with these respective traffic volumes, but, as was dis-
cussed above,"8 this is an inefficient avenue through which to recover ca-
pacity costs. This default capacity is available, however, only because the
central office serving McDonnell-Douglas was virtually dedicated to serv-
ing McDonnell-Douglas's telecommunications needs prior to the imple-
mentation of their bypass system. The area in which this central office is
located is not a high growth area, so there is little prospect of this network
capacity being used for any purpose other than primarily to provide de-
fault network capacity for McDonnell-Douglas. It is also clear that the
37. See Net Gain: Firm Finds Multimillion Dollar Solution, COMPUTER WORLD, Aug. 12,
1985, at 10; McDonnell Rings Up a Money Saver, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 31, 1985, at 6c.
38. Recovery of the costs of the network capacity by usage-sensitive charges results in a cross-
subsidy from general ratepayers to bypassers.
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plant serving McDonnell-Douglas is earning a prescribed rate of return
that is in large part independent of actual levels of usage. 9
Two observations need to be made about the McDonnell-Douglas case.
First, it is clear that Southwestern Bell would incur costs for maintaining
default network capacity for McDonnell-Douglas and that these costs, as-
suming no failure by the McDonnell-Douglas system, are borne by
Southwestern Bell's general ratepayers.' Second, McDonnell-Douglas is
a very large corporation utilizing telecommunications for all aspects of
their business operations, including data processing, defense contracting,
and even reselling of public telecommunications traffic."1 Intuition sug-
gests that their demand for default network capacity is highly price inelas-
tic. In other words, they would be willing to pay the economically efficient
price to insure that their telecommunications traffic remain uninterrupted,
either through self-contained redundancy or default capacity on the public
switched network. Equivalently, the option value that McDonnell-
Douglas places on default network capacity is probably very high indeed.
Unfortunately from the perspective of the local telephone companies,
bypass of local exchange company facilities is not an isolated problem. In
fact, it appears to be an accelerating phenomenon. A recent report by the
FCC"2 cited 1400 cases of bypass with estimated revenue losses ranging
into the hundreds of millions of dollars. The realization that bypass ap-
pears to be an ever-increasing phenomenon is further substantiated in a
report commissioned by the Justice Department (the Huber Report)"3 to
investigate the need for continued line-of-business restrictions on the local
Bell Operating Companies. In the period between 1982 and 1986, the
Huber Report shows a sharp rise in private microwave, private fiber,
metropolitan area networks, and satellite earth stations.
IV. Costing Theory
One of the more subtle issues related to this concept of default capacity
charges is the concept of economic costs and how they should be mea-
sured. This is certainly one of the more elusive issues in telecommunica-
39. The rate of return on this plant is determined by the jurisdictional distribution of actual usage
through the separations process.
40. Note once again the importance of making the distinction between sunk and incremental back-
up costs. McDonnell's default capacity requirements will likely be provisioned out of existing capacity
which represents a problem of sunk cost recovery. The maintenance of this existing capacity for their
default use is a matter of incremental costs.
41. See Newsfront, DATA COMM., Feb. 1985, at 50.
42. See COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FCC, THIRD REPORT ON BYPASS OF THE PUBLIC
SWITCHED NETWORK (May 26, 1987).
43. P. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE
INDUSTRY (June 1987) (published by Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) Table L-23 (following
page 2-23).
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tions today and no doubt itself deserves a paper.44 We shall have to be
content here with simply identifying a few of the central issues and
concepts.
It is instructive to view access to local company facilities as an expand-
able pipe through which varying amounts of traffic may be carried.45 As a
first iteration, capacity costs assignable to the facility bypasser would pre-
sumably be based upon dedicated plant plus that portion of common plant
identified by the bypasser's determination of peak period traffic volumes
and the respective probabilities of default.
The costs associated with the provision of default capacity should be
differentiated on the basis of whether this capacity is provided through
existing plant or new construction. For example, the planning period for
switching equipment may be based on a one or two year forecast, while
feeder cable layouts may be based on a twenty year forecast. As a result, a
facility bypasser who never utilized local company switched access facili-
ties may expect to pay new construction costs for the provision of default
capacity. In this manner the costs associated with uncertain demand re-
quirements are internalized to those customers who represent the source
of the uncertainty.
As with insurance theory,46 network capacity built and maintained to
serve default traffic customers would be based on expected demand for
that capacity and the quality of service provided to default customers.47
Following this line of reasoning, it is apparent that default capacity costs
will depend upon a number of different factors, including facility bypass
penetration in a serving area and the probability of simultaneous demand
44. Lester Taylor has begun some innovative and path breaking research in this area. See L.
Taylor, On Marginal Cost and Marginal-Cost Pricing (Jan, 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
45. This is a perfectly reasonable interpretation given that the plant necessary to increase capacity
for a given customer exists, at least in the ground, and is earning a prescribed rate of return, whether
or not the customer is actually being billed for the maximum number of trunks this plant can serve.
Thus, for the most part, the customer's demand for capacity is truly variable. The facility bypasser's
default capacity requirement will probably be defined in terms of so many Hundred Call Seconds
(CCS) per unit of time which translates into so many dedicated circuits and hence definitive NTS and
TS cost levels.
46. Insurance premiums, in general, are based upon the probability of loss and the monetary
value of the loss that must be compensated in the event the loss occurs. F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCER-
TAINTY AND PROFIT 247 (1971).
47. For example, quality of service can be characterized in terms of blocking probability, which is
the probability of encountering a situation where a call cannot be completed because all circuits are
busy. See AT&T BELL LABORATORIES, supra note 7, at 149. Default capacity costs will assume one
level if blocking probabilities are P=.1 and quite higher levels if blocking probabilities are P=.01. It
may be appropriate to offer default capacity customers varying levels of service quality. Along similar
lines, transponder capacity on satellites may be purchased on a protected, unprotected or preemptible
basis. The rates vary widely across these three types of service. See Nelson, Satellite Appraisals,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1986, at 53.
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for the default capacity as well as the sum of the simultaneous demands at
the peak.
The requisite amount of default capacity in a serving office will decline
monotonically in relation to both the degree to which facility bypass sys-
tem failures are independent of one another and the proportion of total
serving office capacity required by the facility bypasser. That is to say, the
law of large numbers works against facility bypassers whose system fail-
ures are not independent of other facility bypassers and whose default
capacity requirements are a large proportion of total serving office
capacity.
First, suppose that there are initially n facility bypassers in a given
serving area, each with default capacity requirement, y, and probability of
failure, p. In addition, suppose that these n facility bypassers all use mi-
crowave radio. The (n + 1)th bypasser in this serving area also has de-
fault capacity requirement, y, and probability of failure, p, but the facility
bypass system employed by it is fiber optics. Suppose that a severe thun-
derstorm moves into the serving area and knocks out all microwave trans-
mission."8 The serving office would be required to provide default capacity
for all the microwave facility bypassers simultaneously. These are poten-
tially large default capacity requirements, with costs that must be
recouped through default capacity charges. Because these failures are not
independent, serving office capacity requirements are larger than would
otherwise be the case. Conversely, the bypasser utilizing fiber optics may
experience a system failure when a fiber is cut by a construction crew.
This is a type of system failure that is most likely to be independent of the
microwave system failures. As a result, the bypasser utilizing fiber optics
will pay lower default capacity charges than bypassers using microwave
radio even though his default capacity requirements and probability of
failure are identical. 9
Second, default capacity costs will vary directly with the facility bypas-
sers' default capacity requirements as a proportion of total serving office
capacity. Suppose there are two identical serving offices: A and B. Serving
office A serves n facility bypassers, each with default capacity require-
ment, y, and probability of failure, p. Serving office B serves only one
facility bypasser, with a default capacity requirement of ny and
48. The local companies use emergency microwave restoration equipment today in the event a
central office facility fails.
49. Note that there are some rather interesting game-theoretic dimensions to this result. Specifi-
cally, the prospective facility bypasser may have an economic incentive to differentiate the type of
system it selects from the most common form employed in the serving area. See Weisman, Tobin on
Keynes: A Suggested Interpretation, 6 J. POST-KEYNESIAN ECON. 411 (1984), for a discussion of the
informational requirements necessary to affect an optimal economic choice in the presence of this type
of simultaneous decision making.
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probability of system failure, p. For both serving offices expected default
capacity demand is npy, but the variance of default capacity demand over
time is larger for serving office B than it is for serving office A.50 From a
traffic engineering perspective, the large single facility bypasser appears as
a large number of individual users who act in a totally dependent manner.
Since these serving offices must be engineered for peak-load demand, the
default capacity cost incurred per unit of traffic is greater in serving office
B than it is in serving office A. Thus the law of large numbers works
against the relatively large facility bypasser.
Data on the failure rates of bypass systems is not readily available,
largely because there is little market experience with these systems. Cuts
or breaks in fiber optic cable are purely random events which defy any
precision in forecasting. Microwave radio transmission is subject to simi-
larly unpredictable weather-related outages, obstructions in line of sight,
and power failures.
There are two significant points to make with regard to the question of
failure rates of bypass systems. First, many business customers who de-
ploy bypass systems utilize these networks for critical voice and data
transmission requirements. In some cases, excess capacity on these net-
works may even be resold to the public on a for-profit basis. Conse-
quently, system outages in the firm's telecommunications network cannot
be tolerated. As a result, the demand for default capacity, whether it be
self-contained redundancy in the private bypass system or stand-by service
on the public switched network, is likely to be quite inelastic. Second,
irrespective of the quality of the bypass system deployed by the customer,
reliability is unambiguously increased because there are now two telecom-
munications systems-the private bypass system and the public switched
network-replacing one. Consequently, if the bypasser is allowed to de-
fault to the public switched network without compensatory payment for
standby services, the economic incentives exist for that bypasser to
purchase a bypass system with a suboptimal degree of reliability.
This incentive occurs because the bypassers' telecommunications net-
work costs are not internalized. In fact, these circumstances present a clas-
sic free rider problem. The level of default capacity charges is dependent
upon three primary factors: capacity requirements, probability of peak pe-
riod default, and degree of independence of system failures within the area
served by the central office. 51 At least on a theoretical level, the local com-
50. 1 benefited from helpful discussions with Dr. Donald Kridel of the Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.
on this point.
51. Knowledge of the various bypass technologies employed would provide the local companies
with the ability to assess the degree of system failure independence.
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panies can require the would-be bypasser to assume responsibility for in-
forming them of peak-period default capacity requirements as well as the
bypass technology employed. This would allow the local companies to de-
ploy their trunking and switching capacity in an efficient manner. The
local companies could ensure the accuracy of the information provided by
the bypasser by imposing circuit breaker type monitoring equipment on
the bypasser's default capacity facilities. If usage on the default capacity
facilities exceeded the presubscribed capacity requirements, further usage
could be blocked.52 Presumably, this monitoring would provide the facility
bypasser with the proper incentives to report accurate capacity require-
ment information to the local companies, since the bypasser would bear
the cost of incorrect information. This practice would presumably also
protect general rate-payers from network congestion caused by the unfore-
casted network capacity requirements of bypassers.
V. Pricing Concepts
The first and most critical point to make regarding the pricing of de-
fault capacity charges is that this structure for recovering capacity costs is
not a substitute for moving toward cost-based pricing of switched access.
This point is irrefutable. 53 The economic logic underlying the implemen-
tation of default capacity charges is, to a large extent, independent of the
need for cost-based switched access charges. The real problem, of course,
is the usage-sensitive recovery of fixed costs. Are the local companies using
this structure to exploit the local exchange bottleneck? Do the local com-
panies have unlimited market power in providing default capacity? The
answer to both questions is no. The rates the local companies set for de-
fault capacity are bounded from above by the facility bypassers' costs for
building redundancy and back-up capacity in their own private networks.
For example, recent advances in ku band satellite technology could make
it a viable avenue through which facility bypassers could build redun-
dancy. 5' Hence, for the very same reasons the local companies have lim-
52. This function can be performed in all central offices equipped with stored program control
switches that allow for line usage monitoring.
53. There is a common misconception among many industry observers that solving the NTS cost
recovery problem is synonymous with solving the bypass problem. This is false. A large proportion of
Southwestern Bell's business access minutes remain vulnerable to bypass on the traffic sensitive
switched access rate elements alone. Similar results no doubt hold for other local companies. This
scenario arises because in many cases the marginal cost per access minute lies far below average traffic
sensitive revenue requirements. For example, the average traffic sensitive rate is approximately two
and one half to three cents per minute while the incremental cost is approximately one cent per
minute on a statewide average basis. See Development of Intrastate Access Charges: Hearings on
Cause No. 28309 Before the Corp. Comm'n of the State of Oklahoma, (Apr. 1986) (testimony of
Gary L. Mann).
54. While ku band satellite technology is probably not yet cost-effective for voice traffic alone, it is
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ited market power with respect to carrier access, they have limited market
power with respect to the provision of default capacity.
In Part III, I briefly discussed the prospect of raising local company
special access rates in conjunction with the implementation of default ca-
pacity charges.55 This is a critical and controversial pricing issue. It
should be made clear that in reality the market, and the market alone, sets
the price for special access. The availability of facility bypass will set nat-
ural limits on the price charged for special access, thereby rendering the
market contestible. Presumably at some point the perceived risk premium
associated with facility bypass will be dominated by the market price dif-
ferential for the two competing options.
There are at least two countervailing arguments that need to be care-
fully considered with respect to raising special access rates. First, raising
special access rates in conjunction with default capacity charges will tend
to retain would-be bypassers on switched access. This is a positive devel-
opment, if and only if, switched access charges continue to fall toward
underlying marginal cost. But paradoxically, once regulators and politi-
cians see reduced levels of bypass, they are likely to conclude that bypass
is no longer a significant problem and cease any further reductions in
switched-access charges. This would allow them to avoid the political fall
out resulting from increasing local exchange rates. From a cost-benefit
perspective, there may be other arguments that could be used to justify
increasing special access rates during the interim transition toward cost-
based switched-access charges. Presently, there is a massive movement out
of switched access and into high capacity special access facilities. To the
extent that this movement is economically inefficient it may be anticipated
that there will be corresponding movement back to switched-access once
cost-based switched access charges are put in place. Depending on the cost
of converting switched access trunks to special access trunks and vice
versa, it may be justified from a cost-benefit perspective to keep special
access rates high during this interim transition period. 6
It is crucial that the prospective pricing flexibility granted to the local
companies through the implementation of default capacity charges not be
used in an anti-competitive fashion. In markets where competitive alterna-
tives have not evolved sufficiently to provide the requisite discipline, regu-
more than capable of handling a firm's critical data transmission requirement. See C. JACKSON, LONG
HAul. BYPASS TECHNOLOGY AND Cosrs (1985) (Study Prepared for Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company by Shooshan & Jackson, Inc.); K-Mart Picks GTEfor Satellite Net, COMM. WEEK, June
16, 1986, at 24.
55. See supra p, 164 and supra Figure 3.
56. These pricing issues should be analyzed very carefully from both an economic and political
perspective. The above discussion is offered merely to stimulate further thought on these pricing issues
and certainly not to provide a definitive map as to what level these rates should or should not be.
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lators should take appropriate measures to ensure that these charges are
used solely to counter uneconomic entry. The FCC has repeatedly stated
that revenue losses incurred by the local companies are not in themselves a
negative phenomenon. 7 Thus, the FCC is not likely to approve these de-
fault capacity charges simply to prevent revenue losses by the local compa-
nies. This position is correct from the viewpoint of economic efficiency.
Flat rate default capacity charges have interesting implications in the con-
text of peak-load pricing theory. 8 Suppose that a certain percentage of
serving office capacity is purchased under a default capacity flat rate tariff
by a facility bypasser. During periods when the facility bypass system is
operational and not on overflow, default capacity may be utilized by gen-
eral ratepayers without incurring peak period charges. Therefore, these
ratepayers may realize an externality from the use of default capacity. 9
VI. The Regulators' Perspective on Default Capacity Charges
The implementation of a default capacity tariff structure does have reg-
ulatory precedent. In 1984, Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) filed a gen-
eral rate case before the Missouri Public Service Commission requesting,
in part, permission to assess surcharges against customers using electric
heatpumps.6" Laclede based its case on the contention that heatpump cus-
57. On December 20, 1985, Southwestern Bell filed alternative local transport rates with the
FCC, citing recent studies that showed large revenue vulnerability to so called POP Proliferation. In
rather strongly worded language, the Common Carrier Bureau argued, incorrectly I believe, that to
the extent this type of bypass was occurring, it was economic bypass and, hence, in the public interest.
The Common Carrier Bureau's argument is valid, of course, if, and only if, local transport rates are
set at true marginal cost. Generally they are not. See In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Revi-
sion to Tariff, F.C.C. Transmittal No. 1330 (Feb. 14, 1986).
58. See W. BAUMO., ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 173 (1977); Bailey, Peak-
Load Pricing Under Regulatory Constraint, 80 J. POL. ECON., 662 (1972); Wenders, Peak Load
Pricing in the Electric Utility Industry, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 232 (1976).
59. This assumes that at least some bypassers are subscribing to preemptible default capacity
which entails the right to interrupt or preempt residual ratepayers on demand. Analogously, suppose
we initially have a four lane highway engineered for a 40 mile per hour average rate of speed during
peak periods. A fifth lane is built to provide buses and taxis with secondary routes when their primary
routes are unavailable. When this fifth lane is in use by buses and taxis, general commuters may not
use this lane, but if this lane is not in use, then general commuters may use all five lanes. Since the
use of all five lanes will increase the average rate of speed during the peak period above 40 miles per
hour, general commuters realize an externality from the availability of the fifth lane. In addition,
general commuters may realize an externality in terms of higher average rates of speed on the original
four lanes of the highway when taxis and buses initially vacate the original four lanes in favor of their
primary routes.
60. See In re Laclede Gas Co., Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. GR-84-161 (April 16, 1984).
A heatpump is a device which provides space heating by using electrical energy to power a motor
driven pump which extracts heat from the lower temperature outside air. At temperatures above
about 35 degrees Fahrenheit it is more economical to provide space heating by utilizing the electrically
powered heat pump than by combusting natural gas. At lower temperatures the economic incentives
reverse and the heat pump is turned off and gas consumed instead. As a result the heat pump/gas
furnace combination exhibits gas demand only at low temperatures where the entire delivery system is
being subjected to maximum demand.
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tomers display highly nonuniform gas consumption patterns. The vast
majority of their consumption occurs during periods of extremely cold
temperature when aggregate demand is at peak and the cost of gas is
highest. Since Laclede's rates are based on average costs of gas, heatpump
customers are not being assessed rates reflective of the underlying costs
that they cause. Laclede succeeded in meeting the burden of proof that
heatpump customers are subsidized by the average gas ratepayer. The
Missouri Public Service Commission subsequently concurred with La-
clede's heatpump surcharge tariff."'
Two points are noteworthy with respect to the heatpump surcharge is-
sue. First, Laclede was forced to stockpile a natural gas inventory suffi-
cient to meet anticipated demand. As a result, the heatpump customers
derived option value from back-up energy supplies provided by Laclede.
Second, Laclede had earlier argued that its costs for meeting the antici-
pated gas demand were largely fixed.62 Hence, it is economically efficient
that this surcharge be in the form of a flat rate tariff.
In a related natural gas example, large business users of natural gas
may soon be bypassing local gas distribution companies and connecting
directly with the interstate natural gas pipelines. The local distribution
companies (LDCs) put forth an argument strikingly similar to those fre-
quently heard in telecommunications:
Load loss in turn can affect an LDC's allocation of fixed costs,
which may be shifted to the LDC's remaining small volume com-
mercial and residential customers, increasing their rates and al-
lowing pipelines with no service obligation corresponding to that im-
posed by state law on LDCs to "skim the cream" from an LDC's
service territory.63
Within this context, regulators have been urged to adopt stand-by charges
and exit fees. Under the stand-by proposal, a customer choosing to bypass
the LDC would pay a standby charge to retain the right to demand ser-
vice from the LDC in the future, based on the costs the LDC incurs for
demand charges and storage costs necessary to provide service. There
61. Id. However, imposition of the heat pump surcharge was overruled by the Missouri State
Appeals Court in Marco Sales, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 685 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Reversal was based on the limited grounds that there had been insufficient evidence to determine that
34 degrees Fahrenheit was a reasonable estimate of the temperature at which heat pump users
switched to natural gas.
62. See In re Laclede Gas Co., Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. GR-82-158 (Jan. 15, 1982)
(statement of Robert M. Davis).
63. See Lambert, Bypass in the Natural Gas Industry: The Fruit of Regulatory Change, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Apr. 3, 1986, at 12.
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would be no stand-by charges for a customer electing not to retain access
to the LDC system.64
A final analogous case is the treatment of cogeneration in the electric
utility industry.65 Parties utilizing cogeneration cannot be assured of 100%
reliability and normally require a source of backup electric power. The
primary issue centers on the terms and conditions under which electric
utilities provide this backup power. Regulatory authorities who have con-
sidered this issue have generally concluded that while electric utilities are
required to provide back-up service to cogenerators, the utilities are not
required to provide this service at the same rates and under the same
conditions that electric power is made available to general customers. 6
Thus, regulators have explicitly acknowledged that stand-by charges are
to be based upon the cost of potential demand, rather than actual demand
requirements.67
Regulators have considered the problem of stand-by charges in the con-
text of the provision of telephone service by other than certificated tele-
phone corporations." A prime example of other than certificated phone
companies are STS. STS providers are typically landlords or real estate
developers who provide telephone service to the tenants of a building or
office park. STS is generally provided through a customer owned PBX.
The owner of the PBX will generally purchase PBX trunks from the
local telephone company and resell local service to the various subscribing
tenants in the building. One commission considering the specific problem
of STS ruled that an STS was not a regulated phone company within the
64. Id. at 17.
65. Cogeneration is defined as the simultaneous or sequential production of power and useful
thermal energy from one fuel at a single site. In an effort to promote cogeneration, the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2708 (1982)) was signed into law. PURPA mandated, among other things, that utilities
purchase electric energy and capacity made available from qualifying cogeneration and small power
production facilities at just and reasonable rates while being required to provide stand-by and back-up
service to these facilities at nondiscriminatory rates. In assessing what amounts to default capacity
charges for this latter service, utilities generally have been allowed to set charges under the assump-
tion that outages will occur during the system peak. See also Paul, Cogeneration, After Slow Start,
Quickly Coming of Age, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
66. See Electric Utility Forum: Competition, PUB. UT . FORT., May 28, 1987, at 70. For exam-
ple, in California, Southern California Edison has proposed that stand-by users of electric power pay
considerably higher rates per kilowatt hour than general rate-payers.
67. See Trends and Topics: Standby Service Options and Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 3,
1987, at 42.
68. For example, on May 11, 1984 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company filed a petition with
the Missouri Public Service Commission for an investigation of provision of local exchange telephone
service by entities other than certificated telephone corporations, including entities who may resell
local exchange telephone service. See Order Denying Motions and Applications for Rehearing, Mo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Case No. TC-84-233. (Jan. 27, 1986); Report and Order, Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n., Case No. TC-84-233 (Sept. 23, 1985) (testimony of Dennis L. Weisman); Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n., Case No. TO-86-53. (Nov. 1986, Jan. 1987, June 1987) (testimony of Charles B.
Blumenkamp).
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statutory definition because they did not offer phone service to the general
public.69 However, they did rule that the local phone company was not
required to serve as the carrier of last resort for tenants who voluntarily
decided to occupy an STS building. The commission perceived that re-
quiring Southwestern Bell to serve as the carrier of last resort in a com-
petitive market was a residual regulatory obligation that unfairly impeded
Southwestern Bell's ability to effectively compete in the market." °
In what in essence constituted the second round of the first STS case,71
the STS industry raised the issue of the Missouri Public Service Commis-
sion's policy on the carrier of last resort issue. Specifically, the STS indus-
try argued that its growth was stymied by the STS users' inability to
require the local phone company to stand ready to provide back-up capac-
ity. 2 It is noteworthy, however, that the Vermont Public Service Commis-
sion has echoed very similar arguments with regard to the carrier of last
resort obligation as it relates to STS providers. 3
Conclusion
Regulators in telecommunications will likely look favorably upon the
default capacity charge concept in that if administered prudently, default
capacity charges will indeed serve the public interest. It may be instructive
to discuss a few of the positive attributes of the plan. First, the default
capacity tariff structure reduces the cross-subsidies that flow from general
ratepayers to facility bypassers which exist under the present tariff struc-
ture. Under the proposal, facility bypassers would pay all costs directly
attributable to providing back-up capacity. They currently do not. Second,
the proposal is consistent with universal service objectives. The prospective
rate flexibility the local companies will derive from default capacity
69. Report and Order, In re Investigation of the Provision of Local Exchange Telephone Service
by Entities Other than Certificated Telephone Corporations, Including Entities Who May Resell
Local Exchange Telephone Service, Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. TC-84-233 (Sept. 23, 1985).
70. See Order Denying Motion and Application for Rehearing, Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case
No. TC-84-233 (Jan. 27, 1986).
71. See Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. TO-86-53, established by commission order to develop
permanent tariffs for the provision of STS in Missouri.
72. Southwestern Bell contended in opposition that the commission had correctly decided the car-
rier of last resort issue in the first STS case. Specifically, the commission had recognized that imposing
residual regulatory obligations on Southwestern Bell in the face of open competition was itself anti-
competitive. Southwestern Bell should not be required to provide stand-by facilities to serve tenants in
an STS building in case the STS provider should liquidate the operation or otherwise cease to serve
the tenants. It remains Southwestern Bell's policy in this case that it should not be required to serve as
the carrier of last resort without due compensation. General ratepayers should not be asked to subsi-
dize the STS providers' financial ventures by paying for plant and equipment which is deployed in a
stand-by mode with little or no prospect for revenue generation. The order in this case is pending.
73. Report and Order of the State of Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. in Docket No. 4946, at 51 (Feb. 21,
1986).
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charges may prevent the dramatic and sudden local rate increases result-
ing from large-scale bypass while allowing for a more orderly and pro-
active development of local exchange pricing plans. Third, when imple-
mented in conjunction with cost-based tariffs, this proposal will largely
eliminate the prospect of economically inefficient bypass. Special access
rate flexibility resulting from the implementation of default capacity
charges may be used to counter bypass resulting solely from transitional
rate asymmetries. This rate structure will allow prospective facility bypas-
sers to evaluate alternative carrier access choices on a basis more accu-
rately reflecting underlying cost differences. Fourth, the proposal comple-
ments the FCC's access plan in that it is perfectly consistent with efficient
NTS cost recovery. A prime feature of the proposal is the extended,
though by no means indefinite, time horizon it may allow for bringing
local company switched access rates into closer alignment with underlying
economic costs. Fifth, the proposal promotes efficient network utilization,
since it allows for reciprocal sharing of network capacity between facility
bypassers and general ratepayers. The plan thus allows for an externality
flow from bypassers to general ratepayers. When facility bypass systems
are operational and not on overflow, general ratepayers may overflow onto
the idle default capacity during periods of peak utilization which will re-
sult in lower call blockage and perhaps avoidance of peak charges. Sixth,
competitive alternatives in the carrier access market will ensure these de-
fault capacity charges are not administered anti-competitively.
These are just a few of the positive attributes of the default capacity
charges as seen from the regulators' perspective. There are certainly addi-
tional attributes, both positive and negative, which will undoubtedly be
analyzed very carefully by all parties of record in subsequent filings
before the FCC, the state public service commissions, and perhaps the
Joint Board as well. The proposal for default capacity charges, as out-
lined in this Article, represents a step forward in providing a viable ave-
nue through which society may realize the full benefits of competition
while avoiding the prospectively large and irreversible inefficiencies result-
ing from transitional rate asymmetries. Most parties should agree that this
is the goal. Only time and considerable debate will tell if this is the plan.
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